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BILLS AND NOTES-1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
S. B.GILREATH*

Express Provision Concerning Negotiability. PheZan v. Phelanl is

the only case which has been found on the subject of bills and notes
decided during the survey period. It was a suit in equity on a note
in the sum of $4,000 made on April 10, 1954, by R. E. Phelan and
payable to W. 0. Phelan on September 15, 1954. The note provided
that it was "non-negotiable and non-transferable."
The payee, W. 0. Phelan, filed a bill to recover a decree on this
note against R. E. Phelan, the maker, who, in turn, filed an answer
pleading as a set-off against the note a loan of $250 he had made complainant years before and also a car note in the sum of $1976 made
by W. 0. Phelan and payable to R. E. Phelan. The trial court allowed
the set-off and rendered a decree in favor of complainant for the
difference.
The two Phelan brothers were tenants in common of an 87-acre
farm worth about $20,000 and were so estranged that they did not
speak to each other. The estrangement seems to have arisen out of
attempts to settle for improvements estimated at $10,000 which R. E.
Phelan had put on the farm, as compared with $1000 in improvements
made thereon by W. 0. Phelan. Complainant, W. 0. Phelan asked
$10,000 for his undivided half interest. Through the efforts of a mutual
friend, who was not called to testify, it was agreed that R. E. Phelan
would pay $8,500 for-W. 0. Phelan's half interest in the farm, $4,500
cash and the remaining $4,000 to be evidenced by the note on which
the original bill was filed.
At the time of the delivery of the deed, complainant and defendant
met. The deed was delivered to the defendant who paid the complainant $4,500 and delivered the $4,000 note but defendant said
nothing to complainant about the car note or the loan, both of which he
expected to set off against the $4,000 note, and the statement "nonnegotiable and non-transferable" was written in the note in order
that it might be fixed and frozen in the hands of complainant and so
be subject to the set-off. Defendant did not mention the automobile
note of $1976 or the $250 loan because he knew that if he did say
.anything about them his brother would refuse to sell his half interest
in the farm. Complainant contended that defendant's silence about
the intended set-off constituted fraud.
The note is not published in the opinion and it cannot be told
whether it otherwise was negotiable, but the court, without citing
* Professor of Law, Cumberland University, Lebanon, Tennessee.
1. 309 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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authority, correctly treats the statement "non-negotiable and nontransferable" as destroying its negotiability for the purpose of determining the question of fraud. Does such provision destroy negotiability in an instrument otherwise negotiable? On this question the
authorities are few. In Equitable Insurance Co. v. Harvey2 a provision reading: "It is understood and agreed that this note is not
negotiable," did not prevent transfer to the payee's agent, which
sued thereon to collect it.
3
The Uniform Act, section 1,
provides that an instrument to be
negotiable must conform to five requirements, and implies strongly
that if the instrument does conform it is negotiable. Any provision
declaring such instrument to be non-negotiable would be repugnant to
the rest of the instrument. How would it be construed? Would the
weight of reason and common sense favor negotiability or nonnegotiability? In view of the meager authorities on the point, safety
requires that the instrument be so made or drawn that it will not
conform to the provisions of section 1 of the Uniform Act. For example, the words "order" or "bearer" always can be omitted, and then
there can be no question of the instrument's non-negotiability. Of
course, an express statement that the instrument is not negotiable also
will not do any harm.4
On the other hand, suppose that an instrument not otherwise negotiable contains a provision declaring itself to be negotiable, will this
declaration make it so? In Morgan Bros. v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co.5
the bonds involved were not payable to order or bearer, but provided that the principal and interest evidenced by the indenture would
be paid without regard to any equity between the company and the
original or any intermediate holder thereof, and that the receipt of
the registered holder of such principal and interest would be a good
discharge to the company of the same.
After reviewing authorities, the court concludes its holding on the
question by saying:
It was entirely competent, in our judgment, for the parties to so
contract, and, having done so, and these bonds having passed into the
hands of innocent holders for value, such innocent holder will take the
2. 98 Tenn. 636,40 S.W. 1092 (1897).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-101 (1956).
4. See generally, Equitable Insurance Co. v. Harvey, 98 Tenn. 636, 40 S.W.
1092 (1897); Prins v. South Branch Lumber Co., 20 Ill. App. 236 (1886),
"This note is not negotiable," written on margin in red ink; Herrick v. Edwards, 106 Mo. App. 633, 81 S.W. 466 (1904), "Non-negotiable or transferable,"
written on margin, and on back; 'This note is not transferable nor to be used
as collateral without written consent of principal and indorsers. M. F. Marks."
"And if so used shall be absolutely void. J. R. Edwards, Indorser."; Tanners'
Nat'l. Bank v. Lacs, 136 App. Div. 92, 120 N.Y.S. 669 (1909); "Not transferable" written on margin.
5. 134 Tenn. 228, 183 S.W. 1019, 1025 (1916).
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same free from any equities existing between the Company and the
original holder, or any intermediate holder. It is immaterial, therefore, whether the bonds were technically negotiable or not, since this
element of negotiability had been specifically contracted in the instru6
ment.
In this connection it is interesting to notice that the Supreme Court
of Mississippi in Moore v. Vaughn7 held three notes to be nonnegotiable because they were payable "to the order of .................
even though each note contained the statement, "This note is negotiable and payable without defalcation . .. ," and the notes had been
delivered to the person intended to be the payee and by him indorsed
to plaintiff, who claimed as a holder in due course. In that case the
plaintiff insisted that the provision, "This note is negotiable," rendered
the notes negotiable notwithstanding the failure to name the payee.
The court did not follow this contention, but used the following now
often quoted language:
For illustration, if A undertakes to sell B a horse, and puts a label on
a cow reading, '"This is a horse," such label does not change the
character, or name, of the animal. These words alone would not be
sufficient to make an order note a bearer note. The contracts here to
the effect that the notes were negotiable did not supply the requirements
mandatorily fixed by the statute, and do not avail to render them complete and regular on their face, so that Moore can now be declared to be
a holder in due course. 8
6.The supreme court wisely stated that it is "immaterial, therefore,
whether the bonds were technically negotiable or not." 183 S.W. at 1025.

In 1

DANwiELS, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS §

106 (6th ed. 1913) it is said that

under the N.I.L. the instrument must be payable to order or bearer, and is
not negotiable if it is not so payable. To the same effect is the 7th Edition,
§ 122; Gilley v. Harrell, 118 Tenn. 115, 101 S.W. 424 (1907); Ahrens & Ott
Mfg. Co. v. Moore & Sons, 131 Tenn. 191, 174 S.W. 270 (1915) and Weems v.
Neblett, 139 Tenn. 655, 202 S.W. 930 (1918), all hold that instruments, not
payable to order or bearer, are not negotiable under the N.I.L.
"Since an instrument to be negotiable must comply with certain statutory
requirements, a non-negotiable instrument cannot be made negotiable by
contract. There is authority for the view, however, that instruments not
otherwise negotiable may become negotiable by estoppel or contract." 7
Am. JuR. Bills and Notes § 45 (1937). See also id. § 78, and annot., 79,
A.L.R. 29 (1932); 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 123.
Statement in certificate of deposit, "payable on return of this certificate
properly indorsed" made negotiable although certificate not payable to
order or bearer. Felton v. Commercial Nat'l. Bank, 39 Ohio App. 24, 177
N.E. 52 (1930); Nelson v. Citizens Bank, 191 App. Div. 19, 180 N.Y.S. 747
(1920). Contra, Aufderheide v. Moeller, 281 S.W. 965 (Mo. 1926).
"Conditional contracts of sale are non-negotiable instruments in this state.
. . Parties may not impart the character of negotiability to any other
writing not of itself a negotiable instrument under the general law merchant
or by the statutes of the state." American Nat'l. Bank v. Sommerville, 191
Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923). See also Beutel, Negotiability By Contract,
28 ILL. L. REV. 205 (1933); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 214
(7th ed. 1948); Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926);
Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 298 Pac. 705 (1931).
7. 167 Miss. 758, 150 So. 372 (1933). See also Rich v. Starbuck, 51 Ind.
87 (1875).
8. Moore v. Vaughn, 167 Miss. 758, 150 So. 372, 373 (1933).
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In view of the condition of the cases and the mandatory language of
the negotiable instruments statute, two conclusions can be reached
from the draftsman's standpoint: (1) In drawing a negotiable instrument, conform to the statute; in drawing a non-negotiable instrument, do not conform to the statute. (2) Under the holding in
Morgan Bros. v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co.,9 it is possible for the parties
to incorporate an element of negotiability into a non-negotiable contract, provided the thing incorporated (usually the waiver of equities)
does not contravene the law or public policy. It seems that these
are the only two things which can be nailed down. Also, it is hoped
that the collection of authorities may prove helpful to the lawyer
who may have to prosecute or defend a suit involving these questions.
Presumption That Payee of Note Not Indebted to Maker. The
execution of a promissory note raises a disputable presumption that
the payee is not indebted to the maker. This presumption is applicable
in a suit by the payee against the maker wherein the maker sets up
a claim against the payee which the maker alleges was in existence
at the time the note was executed. In Robertson v. Branch,10 the Tennessee Supreme Court said:
We regard it as a well-settled principle that the execution of a note under seal is prima facie evidence of the settlement of all pre-existing accounts between the parties and that it throws the onus of proof on the
party who claims otherwise.
The rule has been held to apply (1) to a suit between the parties to
the note, in which the maker sets up a claim against the payee which
he alleges was in existence at the time the note was executed; (2)
where suit is brought on a claim and the defendant introduces in
evidence a note executed by the plaintiff to him after the time the
claim is alleged to have accrued; (3) where a suit is brought by a
personal representative and the defendant introduces in evidence a
note executed by plaintiff's decedent while the alleged claim was in
existence; (4) where a suit is brought against a personal representative, and he introduces in evidence a note executed by the plaintiff
to his decedent.
The reason for the presumption is that the giving of the note is
looked upon as the result of an accounting, and effects a settlement
of all demands between the parties; that it is too highly improbable
that a person would execute a note in favor of one who owes him
money. Of course, as stated before, the presumption is disputable. 1
9. 134 Tenn. 228, 183 S.W. 1019 (1916).
10. 35 Tenn. 506 (1856).
11. Beneke v. Estate of Beneke, 119 Minn. 441, 138 N.W. 689 (1912); Mundt
v. Mallon, 106 Mont. 242, 76 P.2d 326 (1938); 1 JoNas' COmwmNTAPaEs ON EviDENcE § 49d (2d ed. 1928); Annot., 1914B Am. Ann. Cas. 384 (1914).
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The court of appeals holds that this presumption of settlement continued as evidence in the case throughout the trial and was to be
weighed along with all the other evidence in the case and that the
defendant, R. E. Phelan, the burden being on him to rebut the presumption, had not done so.
The court also holds that the defendant R. E. Phelan, by accepting
the deed to the one-half interest in the farm and obtaining also a
release of complainant's claim to a half interest in the accrued rents
along with a release in favor of the defendant of complainant's right
to redeem another tract of land, had estopped himself to assert the
two items by set-off. The decree below was reversed and a decree
entered in favor of the complainant in accordance with prayers of
the original bill.

